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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to model the likelihood of the bank account holder in a 
traditional fiat money banking system (f-banking) to be e-banking (or mobile-banking) 
financially included.  The Bivariate Probit Sample Selection model is applied with a recent 
data set from the Kenya Financial Access Household Survey 2015, administered by FSD 
Kenya supported by the Central Bank of Kenya, and Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics.  
The results show that there is 91.98% likelihood of f-banked person to be e-banked. By 
contrast, the results also show that the absolute financially excluded have 75.71% probability 
to be e-banking financially included.  Economic intuition mixed with regression analysis 
reveals that for an average financially excluded person, it is as a result of persevering of past 
hardship and an uphill battle to be finally e-banking financially included.  The results raise a 
call to policy makers that the easiness for the f-banked to enter the e-banking market may 
soon result in e-banking cost rising to the detriment of the financially excluded, who have so 
laboriously tested the market in the presence of uninsured and unhedged eminent risk. 
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1. Introduction 
The economic value of financial inclusion is compelling, and evident in the related literature 
reviewed by World Bank (2008), as well as recent empirical studies such as Demirguc-Kunt 
and Klapper (2013).  A reliable and effective financial system is an important link in the 
economy to facilitate needed payment, savings, risk, and credit management services, to 
enable a value-chain of investment in productive activities such as entrepreneurship, taking 
advantage of emerging growth opportunities, and livelihood improvement, among others.  If 
the above intuition makes sense, then the presence or problem of financial inclusion has a 
connotation that the financial system is incomplete or manifests some flaws that demand 
corrective action.  At phase value, the benefits of financial inclusion in a fintech environment 
appear obvious and admirable and corroborated by others including, Burgess and Pande 
(2005), Levine (2005), as well as Duncombe and Boateng (2009 but not without sceptics 
like, Aker and Mbiti (2012: 222).  These authors protest that things like “…m-money systems 
in developing countries are not technically banking from either a financial or legal 
perspective: they do not provide interest on savings or facilitate access to credit from formal 
financial institutions, nor do they insure the value stored in the mobile account…” to which 
we marvel that, while this opinion may be accurate as at 2012 it seems at risk of inaccuracy 
in time. 
 
It is now common knowledge in academia and financial news that there is a small miracle in Kenya 
concerning mobile phone financial incapacitation of the excluded poor masses at the bottom of the 
economy.  This is indicated by the seeming growth in this subsector.   Kenya’s mobile connection 
status stands at around 6.3 million -an increase of approximately 8 million in a space of 12 months.  
With a population of about 47 million this translates to what the practitioners of mobile industry call 
SIM penetration.  Not an impressive concept, but the number is simple and intuitive enough for the 
users.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the likelihood of e-banking (or mobile banking) 
adoption (or inclusion) by the banked masses, and then contrast this with the usual 
traditional banking exclusion likelihood.  For purpose of simplicity I will call the traditional 
brick and mortar banking that deals with fiat money f-banking (or f-money).  In this sense 
when f-banking advances into e-money a scenario arises in which we can ask how many 
banks have adopted e-money, and how many have not.  This intuition says we are dealing 
with the usual financial inclusion and exclusion question.  Meaning, we ask the question 
what is the likelihood of f-banking to be included into e-banking.  Based on this explanation, 
the study will proceed, from now onwards, at par with prior advances in this area.  
Methodologically I use an uncommon application (in financial inclusions studies) of 
Heckman’s family for self-selection Bivariate Probit model. 
 
Prior academic researchers (Demirgu-Kunt and Klapper, 2013) and practitioners in financial 
sector field (World Bank, 2008) have made all the necessary ground work on the 
fundamental questions.  First, what has let to this sudden wave of active research in financial 
inclusion?  Secondly how to measure, and therefore interpret financial inclusion in a more 
systematic way in intra- and international surveys?  Regarding the first question, Johnson 
and Nino-Zarazua (2011:475) does well to summarise the salient points  After synthesising 
the relevant literature debate the author signals the direction of current research, that: the 
financial sector development benefits the don’t-haves, and the   “…evidence suggests that 
60 percent of the impact on the poorest 20 percent operates through aggregate growth while 
40 percent operates through reducing inequality”,  to which they conclude: “The impact of 
this evidence has been to recently shift donor policy emphasis from a focus on providing 
financial services to the poor – in particular via microfinance - to the need to provide 
‘Finance for All’ ”  So the moral of the story is that, if financial sector development benefits 
the downtrodden, then it makes sense to prioritise studies for policy application of “financial 
inclusion” in the sector. 
 
Turning now to what has now become a standard on the proposed definition of financial 
inclusion –  the use of financial services, as opposed to simply access to affiliation or 
membership of a financial product or institution (World Bank, 2008; Johnson and Nino-
Zarazua, 2011; Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2013).  The same definition is used in this 
paper 
 
The past and current papers have made significant progress and their sentiment boiles down 
to, among others, that yes the poor rural citizens are financially excluded, that this exclusion 
(or bad) is not necessarily different from other economic market failures, and most 
enlightening, mobile technology such as that of Kenyan M-Pesa has potential to make the 
needed impact (Beck, et al., 2007; as well as Duncombe  and Boateng, 2009).  The findings 
of prior papers are helpful in this paper, but I have observed that mostly these papers tend to 
focus separately on the unbanked, and sometimes on the banked, and rarely a study 
combines both the bank and unbanked in the same paper, and within the same model.  This 
is the gap addressed by the current paper.  In so doing, this paper awakens the seldom 
considered problem of self-selection.  This problem is addressed in details under 
econometric modelling section. 
 
The remaining part of this paper continues as follows: Section 2 explains the rationales of 
e-money market and M-Pesa, section 3 outlines the econometric model, section 4, 
introduces the data set used in this paper, section 5 is a report of empirical results, and 
section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. The e-money market and the Kenyan M-Pesa 
This paper is motivated by the growth and good work done by M-Pesa, among others, to 
integrate the poor unbanked into the financial sector.  Nevertheless the question does arise, 
which is the subject of this paper that since electronic money has proved to be a good 
convenience to the poor, does it now mean the banked are now becoming excluded to the 
adoption of this fast-growing technology?  By way of clarification, electronic money (or e-
money) is also known by other names like, electronic currency (e-currency), e-cash, or 
digital currency, or mobile money (m-money), or mobile banking (m-baking).  The e-money 
alternative is different to fiat money (bank notes and coins).  In the latter, money is physical, 
but both f-money and e-money have similarities like usage, most of the time.  The e-money 
usages include rapid and borderless transfer of value through pin protected sms’s, and store 
of value, where a balance is allowed to remain in an electronic device like cell phone, like M-
Pesa. 
 
The next question to address before explaining the modelling process, is how does e-money 
(as exemplified by M-Pesa) work, and why does it work?  What makes it work?  M-Pesa is 
known to be a first mover in mobile-money market.  In the Kenyan language, the letter “M” 
stands for mobile, and the word, Pesa means money in Swahili.  So in English is M-Pesa 
says m-money.  M-Pesa has a subscription of above 10 million, around 15000 agents 
 
We now turn to the question of what makes a product like M-Pesa work for the poor. Market 
failures have contributed to the state of financial exclusion.  The e-money alternative is 
known by practitioners and researchers in this field (like, Aker and Mbiti, 2010).  For 
instance, limitation in ATM’s and branch distributions in less urban areas, cost of cash 
transfer particularly for remittances, qualifying barriers in applying for bank account, and cost 
of maintaining a bank account, among others.  In the worst case scenarios, the unbanked 
and the rural poor of Africa seem to have a banking facility substitution of last resort: To 
send cash by long distance taxi driver, bus driver, or other human intermediaries.  Still this 
option comes with high inherent risk, which also points to e-money as a viable option.  
Nevertheless, not everyone is convinced about M-Pesa or at least how M-Pesa say their 
thing:   
 
Although M-Pesa has been touted as "banking the unbanked," on average, M-Pesa 
users are wealthier, better educated, urban, and "already banked" …. Moreover, the 
data suggest that most of the transfers are occurring within urban areas (Aker and 
Mbiti: 221). 
 
Well, notwithstanding the critique, the authors do also acknowledge the manifested 
technological progress:  “M-Pesa and other m-money systems have recently transitioned 
from a pure money transfer system into a payment platform that allows nongovernmental 
organizations, schools, hospitals, and firms to send and receive payments”.  In their paper, 
the authors actually justified their comment with numbers that appeared to support their 
case.  The obvious limitation in this evidence is that the numbers referred to are actually 
absolute means.  This paper will help to evaluate the critique that: whether the banked are 
more likely to be included in e-money than the unbanked. 
 
3. Econometric Model 
3.1. The relevance of self-selection modelling 
In order to study the determinants of the likelihood of e-banking inclusion, one needs to 
consider a population that consists of both the banked (subset1) and the unbanked 
(subset2).  A majority of papers use discrete choice models like Logistic, or Probit.  
However, in in a case where the incidence of self-selection is eminent as in the present 
situation sample selection models ought to be applied.  In the present research question it is 
clear from the introduced subsets that for an analyst to evaluate the (a) likelihood e-banking 
inclusion, such an analyst must first identify (b) the approved bank account holders (here 
proxied by owning bank account).  This means that we do not observe “a” unless we know 
“b”.  The style of econometric framework followed in this paper is similar to Gopane (2017) 
and Greene (2012) for further theoretical background. 
 
3.2. Model Estimation Equations 
3.2.1. Outcome Equation 
Financial Exclusion:  𝑦1𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖,    𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒   𝜀𝑖  ~  𝑁(0, 1)   (1a) 
such that,  𝑦1𝑖 = 1(𝑦1𝑖
∗ ≥ 0),    𝑎𝑛𝑑    𝑃(𝑦1𝑖 = 1) =  𝛷(𝑥𝑖 ′𝛽) (1b) 
Marginal Effects: 𝜃1 =
𝜕𝑃(𝑦1𝑖=1)
𝜕𝑥
=  𝜑(𝑥𝑖  ′𝛽)𝛽   (1c) 
 
In equation (1a), 𝑦1𝑖
∗  is a latent variable measuring the underlying propensity for an individual 
𝑖  to be excluded.  The subscript 1 indicates equation 1.  From equation (1b), 𝑦1𝑖 is a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether an individual 𝑖 is classified excluded, which 
happens if 1(𝑦1𝑖
∗ ≥ 0).  𝑥𝑖 ′𝛽  is an index function,  𝑥𝑖 is a vector of factors that influence the 
the likelihood of exclusion, 𝛽 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, and  𝜀𝑖 is, by 
assumption, a normally distributed disturbance term with a mean of zero, and a variance of 
1. The probability of observing financial exclusion given by a normal cumulative density 
function, 𝛷(. ).  Equation 1c serves to indicate that the probability of the outcome equation 
(exclusion) must be interpreted with reference to the marginal effects but not the, 
coefficients, 𝛽 alone. 
 
3.2.2. Sample Selection Equation 
Identifying Banked vs Unbaked: 𝑦2𝑖
∗ = 𝑧𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 ,         𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒     𝜇𝑖   ~  𝑁(0, 1)  (2a) 
such that, 𝑦2𝑖 = 1(𝑦2𝑖
∗ ≥ 0),    𝑎𝑛𝑑    𝑃(𝑦2𝑖 = 1) = 𝛷(𝑧𝑖′𝛾) (2b) 
Marginal Effects: 𝜃2 =
𝜕𝑃(𝑦2𝑖=1)
𝜕𝑧
=  𝜑(𝑧𝑖′𝛾)𝛾    (2c) 
 
In equation (2a), 𝑦2𝑖
∗  is a latent variable measuring the underlying propensity for an individual 
𝑖  to be classified is banked.  The subscript 2 indicates equation 2.  From equation (2b), 𝑦2𝑖 
is a dichotomous variable indicating if an individual 𝑖 is banked, which occurs if 1(𝑦2𝑖
∗ ≥ 0).  
𝑧𝑖′𝛾  is the index function, 𝑧𝑖 is a vector of factors that determine a random individual to be 
be banked, 𝛾 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, and  𝜇𝑖 is a normally distributed 
disturbance term with a mean of zero, and a variance of 1. The probability of observing a 
banked individual is given by a normal cumulative distribution function, 𝛷(. ).   
 
3.2.3. Selection Assumption and Bivariate Normal Distribution 
The moral of the story in equations 1 and 2 is that, we only observe individuals who are 
approved bank account holders (the banked), and not all possible bankable individuals in 
Kenya.  For this reason, the modelling process is designed to take this into 
consideration. 
 
Selectivity:   𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜀𝑖, 𝜇𝑖) =  𝜌     and    𝜀𝑖𝜇𝑖    ~  𝑁2(0, 0, 1, 𝜌𝜀𝜇) (3a) 
Conditional probability: 𝑃(𝑦𝑖1 = 1 | 𝑦𝑖2 = 1) = 𝛷2(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽,   𝑧𝑖′𝛾) 𝑧𝑖′𝛾⁄   (3b) 
 
From equations (3a) and (3b) the subscript of 2 (on 𝑁 and 𝛷) refers to bivariate normal 
distribution, and  𝜌 is the correlation coefficient.  If 𝜌 ≠ 0, the 𝜀𝑖 and  𝜇𝑖 are correlated.  If  𝜌 =
0, then the two error terms are uncorrelated, and the bivariate normal cumulative distribution 
function, 𝛷2 in (3b) reduces to two univariate cumulative distribution functions.  If  𝜌 = 1, 
then the two equations are exactly the same.  The log-likelihood in equation 4 is based on 
the predicted probabilities analysed in Table 5, and is fitted through the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation procedure. 
 
𝐿𝑛𝐿 = ∑ {
𝑦𝑖1𝑦2𝑖ln [𝛷2(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽,   𝑧𝑖
′𝛾, 𝜌)] + (1 − 𝑦𝑖1)𝑦2𝑖𝑙𝑛[𝛷2(−𝑥𝑖
′𝛽,   𝑧𝑖
′𝛾, −𝜌)]
+(1 − 𝑦2𝑖)ln [1 − 𝛷(𝑧𝑖′𝛾)]
}𝑁𝑖=1     (4) 
 
 
Figure 1:  Schematic Diagram of BiProbit Sample Selection Model for e-banking Inclusion  
 
 
 
4. Data Characteristics 
In this paper we use FinAccess Household Survey 2015 that is collected by the Financial 
Sector Deepening Programme of Kenya (hereafter, FSD Kenya) supported by Central Bank 
of Kenya; (CBK); and Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), and published in 2016.  
The data set is conducted through established statistical survey procedures for similar 
instruments.  The interviews were carried out for 8,665 individuals aged 16 and above.  A 
total of 10 008 adults were interviewed on one-on-one basis using a Kish selection grid in 
834 clusters over 13 sub-regional counties.   
 
Table 1 contains a summary of descriptive statistics of the covariates and independent 
variables used in equations 1 and 2.  The table contains 13 languages (proxies for 
ethnicities) where English is used as a base language for dummy design, and 13 sub-
regions where Nairobi is used as a base.  Other variables are income groups, and age.  
Socio-economic variables, demographic variables, and wellbeing indicators are important as 
determinants of financial inclusion likelihood.  In terms of variable design this study is closer 
Johnson and Nino-Zarazua (2011). 
B1 
Banked 
C1 
Unbanked 
E1 
Probability of 
Exclusion 
D1 
Probability of 
Inclusion 
A1 
Survey 
Sample  
O  
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
E-money (Dependent variable 1) 0.8136 0.6673 0 0
Bank usage (Dependent variable 2) 0.2919 0.4547 0 1
Wealthindex 0.0038 0.9995 -1.3580 3.2021
Age group (base=16-18yrs)
18-25yrs 0.2282 0.4197 0 1
26-35yrs 0.2939 0.4556 0 1
36-45yrs 0.1763 0.3811 0 1
46-55yrs 0.1011 0.3014 0 1
>55 0.1491 0.3562 0 1
Lighting  (Base: Firewood)
Paraffin 0.5118 0.4999 0 1
Electricity 0.4482 0.4973 0 1
Financial Literacy (Base: Low)
Medium 0.3502 0.4771 0 1
High 0.2862 0.4520 0 1
Mobile Ownership (base: yes) 0.7422 0.4375 0 1
Do you need bank account? 
No I don’t 0.4827 0.4997 0 1
Unsure 0.0123 0.1103 0 1
Age 37.1169 16.4500 16 100
Age square 1648.2330 1538.9970 256 10000
Female (base: male) 0.6090 0.4880 0 1
Mobile owner (base: not own) 0.2578 0.4375 0 1
Income Group (base: KSh0-100) in 
Kenyan Shilling (KSh)
KSh101-1500# 0.1473 0.3544 0 1
KSh1501-3000 0.1569 0.3637 0 1
KSh3001-7500 0.2474 0.4315 0 1
KSh7501-15000 0.2150 0.4109 0 1
KSh15001-30000 0.1378 0.3447 0 1
KSh30001-50000 0.0447 0.2066 0 1
KSh 50001 - 100000 0.0325 0.1773 0 1
KSh 100001 - 200000 0.0069 0.0829 0 1
Over KSh 200000 0.0042 0.0648 0 1
Urban (base: rural) 0.4426 0.4967 0 1
Language (base:English)
Swahili 0.5254 0.4994 0 1
Kikuyu 0.0426 0.2019 0 1
Luo 0.0386 0.1926 0 1
Meru 0.0174 0.1306 0 1
Kisii 0.0066 0.0808 0 1
Luhya 0.0023 0.0484 0 1
Kalenjin 0.0242 0.1535 0 1
Kamba 0.0653 0.2471 0 1
Somali 0.0610 0.2393 0 1
Turkana 0.0107 0.1027 0 1
Masai 0.0028 0.0530 0 1
Embu 0.0006 0.0242 0 1
Sub-region (base: Nairobi)
Central 0.1017 0.3022 0 1
Mombasa 0.0378 0.1906 0 1
Coast 0.0796 0.2707 0 1
Upper Eastern 0.0485 0.2149 0 1
Mid Eastern 0.0817 0.2740 0 1
Lower Eastern 0.0890 0.2847 0 1
North Eastern 0.0667 0.2495 0 1
Nyanza 0.0992 0.2989 0 1
North Rift 0.0551 0.2282 0 1
Central Rift 0.1058 0.3075 0 1
South Rift 0.0876 0.2827 0 1
Western 0.0883 0.2837 0 1
Table 1: Descriptive Sammary Statisitcs
The surveyors targeted 14 houses within each cluster.  The survey sampling methodology 
used by FSD Kenya is detailed in National Sample Survey and Evaluation Programme 
(NASSEP-V, 2014) designed by KBNS for national surveys.  This data set was 
used previously in empirical research by Aker and Mbiti (2010), Johnson and 
Nino-Zarazua (2011), Mwangi and Sichei (2011), Shem and Njoroge (2012), as well as 
Mwangi and Ouma (2012). 
 
5. Empirical Results 
The labels, C, D, and E in the first column of Table 2, refer to the terminal points of the tree 
diagram in Fig 1.).  The observations in column II, and predicted probabilities in column III 
are linked to equations 1, 2, and 3. Column IV reports the average probabilities for the 
equations in column III, and they add up to unity.   
 
Table 2: Predicted Probabilities (from equation 1 and 2)  
I II III IV 
From: 
Figure 1 
Observation Predicted Probability 
Average 
Probability 
C 𝑦𝑖2 = 0 𝑃( 𝑦𝑖2 = 0)  =  1 − 𝛷(𝑧𝑖 ′𝛾) 0.7969 
D 𝑦𝑖1 = 1, 𝑦𝑖2 = 1 𝑃(𝑦𝑖1 = 1, 𝑦𝑖2 = 1)  =  𝛷2(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽,   𝑧𝑖
′𝛾, 𝜌) 0.0235 
E 𝑦𝑖1 = 0, 𝑦𝑖2 = 1 𝑃(𝑦𝑖1 = 0, 𝑦𝑖2 = 1)  =  𝛷2(−𝑥𝑖
′𝛽,   𝑧𝑖
′𝛾, −𝜌) 0.2696 
These probabilities are part of the post-estimation of equations 1 and 2, 
with a statistical software application.  This includes numbers for Eq 5a 
and 5b. 
1 
 
The main results of this study is represented through equation 5a which gives a conditional 
probability (pcond1) of (a) a banked individual adopting e-banking (or m-banking), given that 
the same individual is (b) banked.  Equation 5a below shows that the joint probability of “a” 
and “b” is 0.9198.  This means that a banked person has a 91.98% of experiencing 
e-banking (or m-banking) financial inclusion. 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖1 = 1 | 𝑦𝑖2 = 1) =
𝛷2(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽,   𝑧𝑖
′𝛾,𝜌)
𝛷(𝑧𝑖′𝛾)
= 0.9198,            𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ     𝑝_𝑣𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000.                          5a 
 
In contrast, terminal C of Figure 1 (or row C of Table 3) shows that, the f-banking financial 
exclusion is approximately 80%.  Johnson and Nino-Zarazua (2011) report an exclusion rate 
of around 70% in their study for Kenya and Uganda.  To recapitulate, are we ready to test 
Aker and Mbiti (2012) that the banked are taking-up m-banking more than the unbanked?  
Well the terminal C actually report the f-banking exclusion.  So, to address the Acker and 
Mbiti we need to consider Figure 2a (in appendix) and compare conditional probabilities of 
terminal D2 with terminal D1 (of Fig 1).  Conditional probability for D1 is reported in 
equation -5a.  Conditional probability for D2 is given in equation 5b, as follows: 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖1 = 1 | 𝑦𝑖2 = 0) =
𝑃(𝑦𝑖1 = 1 , 𝑦𝑖2 = 0)
1 − 𝛷(𝑧𝑖′𝛾)
= 0.7571,        𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ     𝑝_𝑣𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000.       5𝑏                                     
 
So, the likelihood of an already f-banking excluded and now entering the m-banking system 
is 75.71%, which is indeed less than the adoption rate of the f-banked (reported in equation 
5a) at 91.98%.  Well, on the basis of these results Aker and Mbiti (2012), have a case.  Well, 
given the hype around the M-Pesa’s needed miracle, and the cautiousness of the f-banking 
system to lag-behind M-Pesa’s brave innovation, one would have thought the reverse is the 
case.  In fact while there is more clues in the individual variables in Table 3, overall the truth 
is, the poor people have a steep hill to climb even to access the less expensive M-Pesa 
service. 
 
 Looking first at the f-banking exclusion model (PANEL B of Table 3):  Out of the 13 sub-
regions, 6 have insignificant margins meaning no effect on the likelihood of been f-banking 
included. For the remaining 7, the 6 sub-regions have negative signs, meaning that if you 
are a resident of these areas you have less chance of been f-banking included compared to 
the up marked city of Nairobi.  Only on sub-region has a positive sign giving its citizens a 
better chance than Nairobi to be f-banked.  Considering the next variable, ethnicity (proxied 
by languages), there are 4 insignificant coefficients judged by margins.  For the remaining 8, 
only 2 (Kissii and Turkana) gives you a better chance than English speakers to be 
f-financed. 
 
Regarding clusters, the urban dwellers have a better chance than the rural’s to be f-banked.  
The variable for income group tell the same story, the lowest 3 income groups do not affect 
(insignificant) the propensity to be f-banked, while the top earners do affect in a positive way.  
For the remaining variables, when you are old (age square), or female, or don’t have mobile 
phone (indicative of poverty), your f-bank inclusion chances are negative.  A strange variable 
is for those who say they don’t want an f-bank account yet they have a better chance than 
those who want (the yes).  Could these be rich people who do not trust the f-banking system!  
Regarding PANEL A (of Table 3), paraffin and electricity are irrelevant for f-banking 
join- ability.  In general, hardships increases the likelihood of adopting e-money, while the 
well-offness increases the probability of f-banking inclusion. 
 Table 3:  Empirical Results for Equations 1 and 2
Variable Coefficient Margins Pvalue
Independent Variable: e-money
Wealth index -0.3124 -0.0215 0.0080***
Rural money risk 0.2051 0.0804 0.0000***
Age group (base=16-18yrs)
18-25yrs 1.5890 0.3023 0.0000***
26-35yrs 1.5709 0.4503 0.0000***
36-45yrs 1.7076 0.4560 0.0000***
46-55yrs 1.1548 0.4082 0.0000***
>55yrs 1.0978 0.3571 0.0000***
Lighting  (Base: Firewood)
Paraffin 0.5100 0.0332 0.3170
Electricity 0.7286 0.0204 0.5800
Financial Literacy (Base: Low)
Medium 0.1213 0.1842 0.0000***
High 0.5161 0.2644 0.0000***
Mobile Ownership (base: yes)
Mobile owner 1.4303 0.6659 0.0000***
Constant -2.2121
Dependent Variable:  Formal Banking Usage
Do you need bank account? 
No I don’t 0.4734 0.1500 0.0000***
Unsure 0.0517 0.0050 0.9160
Age 0.0474 0.0057 0.0000***
Age square -0.0004 -0.0592 0.0000***
Female (base: male) -0.1850 -0.2213 0.0000***
Mobile owner (base: not own) -0.8157 0.0110 0.0000***
Income Group (base: KSh0-100) in Kenyan 
Shilling (KSh)
KSh101-1500# -0.4101 -0.0866 0.1860
KSh1501-3000 -0.2788 -0.0592 0.3670
KSh3001-7500 0.0320 0.0123 0.8510
KSh7501-15000 0.3966 0.1312 0.0470**
KSh15001-30000 0.7458 0.2609 0.0000***
KSh30001-50000 1.0712 0.3902 0.0000***
KSh 50001 - 100000 1.1493 0.4234 0.0000***
KSh 100001 - 200000 1.4309 0.5281 0.0000***
Over KSh 200000 1.6918 0.6047 0.0000***
Urban (base: rural) 0.4719 0.1510 0.0000***
Language (base:English)
Swahili -0.2871 -0.1034 0.0000***
Kikuyu -0.1277 -0.0492 0.1380
Luo -0.3665 -0.1212 0.0010***
Meru -0.7355 -0.2239 0.0000***
Kisii 0.1752 0.0742 0.3650
Luhya -6.1757 -0.0432 0.1174
Kalenjin -0.3870 -0.1276 0.0010***
Kamba -0.5150 -0.1679 0.0000***
Somali -0.9385 -0.2582 0.0000***
Turkana 0.9993 0.4082 0.0000***
Masai -0.5581 -0.1964 0.0280**
Embu -0.2245 -0.1222 0.4990
Sub-region (base: Nairobi)
Central -0.1148 -0.0383 0.1850
Mombasa -0.2225 -0.0657 0.0400**
Coast -0.1923 -0.0564 0.0610*
Upper Eastern -0.2116 -0.0667 0.0460**
Mid Eastern 0.1514 0.0588 0.0760*
Lower Eastern -0.1080 -0.0359 0.3550
North Eastern -0.7890 -0.1937 0.0000***
Nyanza -0.2120 -0.0674 0.0280**
North Rift -0.1652 -0.0561 0.1070
Central Rift -0.1083 -0.0326 0.2420
South Rift -0.0346 -0.0116 0.6960
Western -0.0800 -0.0230 0.4550
Constant -1.7836
/athrho -0.5818 Pvalue: 0.0000***
Rho -0.5240
LR Test Statistic (Ho: Rho=0, Equatns equal) Chi (1) = 19.73 Pvalue: 0.0000***
Reject H0,  conclude not equal.
Legend:                                            ***   1%                       ** 5%                              * 10%
PANEL B
Sample Selection Equation:   Likelihood of inclusion in traditional banking (Banked)
PANEL A
Outcome Equation:  Likelihood of e-banking inclusion
6. Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to evaluate the conditional likelihood of a random individual to be 
mobile-banking included, conditional upon been traditional (fiat money) banked.  To put it 
more practically, the research question inquires whether the people with bank account stand 
a better chance of becoming mobile-bank users.  Are the f-banked more likely to be 
e-banked than the complete financially excluded?  We used BiProbit sample selection model 
along with national survey data set from Kenya to answer the question.  The answer is, yes.  
The f-banked has 91.98% of digital financial inclusion compared to the absolute excluded 
who has 75% likelihood of e-money financial inclusion. 
 
 
 
7. Reference 
 
Aker, J., and Mbiti, I. (2010). Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(3): 207-232. 
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt,A., and Peria, M.S.M (2007).  Reaching out: Access to and use of 
banking services across countries. Journal of Financial Economics, 85(1): Pages 234-
266. 
Burgess, Robin, and Pande, R. (2005).  Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian 
Social Banking Experiment. The American Economic Review, 95(3): 780-95. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., and Klapper, L. (2013). Measuring Financial Inclusion: Explaining 
Variation in Use of Financial Services across and within Countries. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity: 279-321. 
Duncombe, R., and Boateng, R. (2009). Mobile Phones and Financial Services in 
Developing Countries: A Review of Concepts, Methods, Issues, Evidence and Future 
Research Directions. Third World Quarterly, 30(7), 1237-1258. 
FSD Kenya. (2016).  Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, FinAccess 
Household Survey 2015, Harvard Dataverse, V4. 
Gopane, T. (2017).  Modelling the Takeover Likelihood using BiProbit Sample Selection 
Model: Evidence from Australia, Working Paper, November-December. 
Greene, W. (2012).  Econometric Analysis, 7th edition.  Pearson: New York.  
Johnson, S.and Nino-Zarazua, S.M. (2011). Financial Access and Exclusion in Kenya and 
Uganda. The Journal of Development Studies, 47(3): 475-496. 
Levine, Ross. (2005).  Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence. In Handbook of 
Economic Growth, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf. Elsevier Science: 
Netherlands. 
Mwangi, I.W., and Sichei, M.M. (2011).  Determinants of Access to Credit by Individuals in 
Kenya: A Comparative Analysis of the Kenya National FinAccess, Surveys of 2006 and 
2009. European Journal of Business and Management, 3(3): 206-226. 
Mwangi, I.W., and Ouma, A.S. (2012).  Social capital and access to credit in Kenya. 
American Journal of Social and Management Sciences, 3(1): 8-16. 
NASSEP-V. (2014).  National Sample Survey and Evaluation Programme, Kenya - 
Demographic and Health Survey, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Government of 
Kenya. 
Shem, A.O, Misati, R, and Njoroge, L. (2012). Factors driving usage of financial services 
from different financial access strands in Kenya. Savings and Development, 36(1), 71-89. 
World bank. (2008). Indicators of Financial Access – Household levels survey.   
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/539914-
1118439900885/20700929/Indicators_of_Financial_Access_Household_Level_Surveys.p
df.  Downloaded 1 January 2018. 
World Bank. (2008). Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access. 
Washington. 
 
  
Appendix 
 
Figure 2a:  Schematic Diagram of BiProbit Sample Selection Model for Fintech 
Inclusion – for the Unbanked case 
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